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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRENDA F. ELLINGSWORTH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970456-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported 
by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but 
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer 
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and 
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only 
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has 
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or 
otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109 (1994) provided: 
§ 35-1-109. Workers1 compensation insurance fraud --
Elements -- Penalties -- Notice. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-201(3). 
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(1). 
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(2). 
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-1-601(8). 
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(3). 
(2) Any person who has intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly, devised any scheme or artifice to obtain 
workers' compensation insurance coverage, disability 
compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional 
services, fees for professional services, or anything of 
value under this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly communicates or 
causes a communication with another in furtherance of the 
scheme or artifice, is guilty of workers' compensation 
insurance fraud, which is punishable in the manner 
prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the 
offense of workers' compensation insurance fraud under 
the same conditions as those set forth in Section 
76-2-204 . 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense 
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value 
of all property, money, or other things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described 
in Subsection (1) , except as provided in Subsection 
76-10-1801(1) (e) . 
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a 
necessary element of the offense described in Subsection 
(1) . 
(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any 
offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently 
deprive any person of property, money, or anything of 
value is not a necessary element of this offense. 
(7) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance coverage includes any scheme or 
2 
artifice to make or cause to be made any false written or 
oral statement or business reorganization, incorporation, 
or change in ownership intended to obtain insurance 
coverage as mandated by this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do not reflect 
the risk, industry, employer, or class codes actually 
covered by the policy. 
(8) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability 
compensation includes a scheme or artifice to collect or 
make a claim for temporary disability compensation as 
provided in Section 35-1-65 while working for gain. 
(9) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in 
connection with this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or 
furnishes a form to any person upon which that person 
applies for insurance coverage, reports payroll, makes a 
claim by reason of accident, injury, death, disease, or 
other claimed loss, or otherwise reports or gives notice 
to the insurer or self-insured employer, shall cause to 
be printed or displayed in comparative prominence with 
other content the statement: "Any person who knowingly 
presents false or fraudulent underwriting information, 
files or causes to be filed a false or fraudulent claim 
for disability compensation or medical benefits, or 
submits a false or fraudulent report or billing for 
health care fees or other professional services is guilty 
of a crime and may be subject to fines and confinement in 
state prison." This statement shall be preceded by the 
words: "For your protection, Utah law requires the 
following to appear on this form: or other explanatory 
words of similar meaning. 
(10) Each insurer or self-insured employer who 
issues a check, warrant, or other financial instrument in 
payment of compensation issued under this chapter or 
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to 
be printed or displayed in comparative prominence above 
the area for endorsement the statement: "Workers' 
compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by 
Utah law." 
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, 
insurer, or governmental entity that reports a suspected 
fraudulent act relating to a workers' compensation 
insurance policy or claim is not subject to any civil 
liability for libel, slander, or any other relevant cause 
of action. 
(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, 
this section supersedes Title 31A, Chapter 31, Insurance 
Fraud Act. 
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Utan Admin. R. 156-67-602 provides: 
R156-67-602. Medical Records. 
In accordance with Subsection 58-67-803 (1), 
medical records shall be maintained to be consistent with 
the following: 
(1) all applicable laws, regulations, and 
rules; and (2) the Code of Medical Ethics of the Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs as published in the AMA 
Policy Compendium, 1996 edition, which is hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
Utah R. Evid. 506 provides: 
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or 
is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental 
health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or 
reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed, to 
practice medicine in any state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is 
or is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed 
or certified in any state as a physician, psychologist, 
clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family 
therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated 
as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse 
specialist, or professional counselor while that person 
is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or 
emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information 
is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of 
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a 
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
(1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, 
by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) 
information obtained by examination of the patient, and 
(3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician 
or mental health therapist, and persons who are 
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the 
direction of the physician or mental health therapist, 
including guardians or members of the patient's family 
who are present to further the interest of the patient 
because they are reasonably necessary for the 
transmission of the communications, or participation in 
the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the 
physician or mental health therapist. 
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(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may 
be claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator 
of the patient. The person who was the physician or 
mental health therapist at the time of the communication 
is presumed to have authority during the life of the 
patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this 
rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. 
As to a communication relevant to an issue of the 
physical, mental, or emotional condition of the 
patient in any proceeding in which that condition 
is an element of any claim or defense, or, after 
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which 
any party relies upon the condition as an element 
of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For 
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings 
to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if 
the mental health therapist in the course of 
diagnosis or treatment has determined that the 
patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For 
communications made in the course of, and pertinent 
to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of 
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a 
patient, whether a party or witness, unless the 
court in ordering the examination specifies 
otherwise. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE AND AMICUS FAIL TO ADDRESS THE 
SIGNIFICANT GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OVER THE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, WHICH 
RENDERS WCF AND ITS EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENTAL 
ACTORS FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 14-34; 
Amicus brief at Point I, pp. 4-21) 
Like the trial court, the State and WCF focus on 
irrelevant aspects of WCF's structure, operations, and existence, 
while neglecting or refusing to grapple with the significant state 
ties that render WCF a governmental entity for purposes of the 
fourth amendment. Both the State and WCF must concede the facts 
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relied upon by Ms. Ellingsworth, because they are set forth by 
statute: 
1) WCF is created by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-2(1) (a) 
(1994) (now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-102 (Supp. 1997)) . 
2) WCF's directors are appointed by the Governor, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1994) 
(now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (Supp. 1997)). 
3) Directors are removable for cause by the Governor. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-3-5(10) (1994) (now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-33-106(10) (Supp. 1997)). 
4) Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-8 (1994) (now codified at Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-33-109 (Supp. 1997)) extends immunity1 to good faith 
actions of officers and employees of the fund. 
5) Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-18 (1994) (now codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-33-104 (Supp. 1997)) exempts WCF from certain 
specific statutes that otherwise apply generally to all 
governmental agencies (e.g. GRAMA, Utah Administrative Services 
Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act). 
These aspects of governmental control more than suffice 
to render WCF a governmental actor for purposes of the rights 
xThe State and WCF take issue with appellant's 
characterization of this immunity as "governmental." Without 
getting into semantics, it suffices to say that the immunity given 
the officers and employees of WCF as against the whole world is far 
more sweeping than any immunity available to officers and trustees 
under §§ 16-10a-840 (4) and 16-10a-841 as against only the 
corporation and shareholders. Whether or not this is truly 
"governmental" immunity, it is at minimum quite similar. 
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guaranteed to the citiz ens through the Bill of Rights, including 
the fourth amendment. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT 
GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL IS THE CRITICAL 
INQUIRY IN CONSIDERING WHETHER AN ENTITY 
IS A GOVERNMENTAL INSTRUMENTALITY. 
In addressing whether an entity is a government actor for 
purposes of the rights guaranteed to the people under the 
constitution, the Supreme Court has focused on the issue of 
control. In Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 
376, 115 S.Ct. 961, 963, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995), the United States 
Supreme Court considered "whether actions of the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, commonly known as Amtrak, are subject to the 
constraints of the Constitution." The Court found: 
Facing the question of Amtrak's status for the first 
time, we conclude that it is an agency or instrumentality 
of the United States for the purpose of individual rights 
guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution. 
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394, 115 S.Ct. at 972. 
We hold that where, as here, the Government 
creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance 
of governmental objectives, and retains for itself 
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the 
directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of 
the Government for purposes of the First Amendment. 
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400, 115 S.Ct. 974-5. The Court explained its 
rationale as follows: 
That Government-created and -controlled 
corporations are (for many purposes at least) part of the 
Government itself has a strong basis, not merely in past 
practice and understanding, but in reason itself. It 
surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is 
able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the 
Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form. 
On that thesis, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 
S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), can be resurrected by 
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the simple device of having the State of Louisiana 
operate segregated trains through a state-owned Amtrak. 
In Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of 
Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230, 77 S.Ct. 806, 1 L.Ed.2d 792 
(1957) (per curiam), we held that Girard College, which 
had been built and maintained pursuant to a privately 
erected trust, was nevertheless a governmental actor for 
constitutional purposes because it was operated and 
controlled by a board of state appointees, which was 
itself a state agency. Id., at 231, 77 S.Ct., at 806. 
Amtrak seems to us an a fortiori case. 
Amtrak was created by a special statute, 
explicitly for the furtherance of federal governmental 
goals. As we have described, six of the corporation's 
eight externally named directors (the ninth is named by 
a majority of the board itself) are appointed directly by 
the President of the United States--four of them 
(including the Secretary of Transportation) with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. See §§ 543(a) (1) (A), 
(C)-(D). Although the statute restricts most of the 
President's choices to persons suggested by certain 
organizations or persons having certain qualifications, 
those restrictions have been tailor-made by Congress for 
this entity alone. They do not in our view establish an 
absence of control by the Government as a whole, but 
rather constitute a restriction imposed by one of the 
political branches upon the other. Moreover, Amtrak is 
not merely in the temporary control of the Government (as 
a private corporation whose stock comes into federal 
ownership might be); it is established and organized 
under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing 
federal governmental objectives, under the direction and 
control of federal governmental appointees. It is in 
that respect no different from the so-called independent 
regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications 
Commission or the Securities Exchange Commission, which 
are run by Presidential appointees with fixed terms. It 
is true that the directors of Amtrak, unlike 
commissioners of independent regulatory agencies, are 
not, by the explicit terms of the statute, removable by 
the President for cause, and are not impeachable by 
Congress. But any reduction in the immediacy of 
accountability for Amtrak directors vis-a-vis regulatory 
commissioners seems to us of minor consequence for 
present purposes--especially since, by the very terms of 
the chartering Act, Congress's "right to repeal, alter, 
or amend this chapter at any time is expressly reserved." 
45 U.S.C. § 541. 
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397-8, 115 S.Ct. at 973-4. 
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B. THE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL ELEMENTS FOUND 
DISPOSITIVE IN LEBRON ARE PRESENT HERE, 
AND COMPEL A FINDING THAT WCF IS A 
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY SUBJECT TO THE 
CONSTRAINTS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
The instant case is on all fours with Lebron. "Amtrak 
was created by a special statute, explicitly for the furtherance of 
federal governmental goals." 513 U.S. at 3 97, 115 S.Ct. at 973. 
So here, WCF was created by special statute for the purpose of 
providing workers' compensation insurance, Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-2 
(1994) ,2 and being the insurer of last resort, Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-1001 (1994). Six of Amtrak's nine directors were appointed 
by the President (four with the advice and consent of the Senate), 
with a seventh selected by a majority of the other eight. Here, 
five of WCF's directors are appointed directly by the Governor with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5(5) 
(1994).3 A sixth is the Director of the Department of 
Administrative Services or his designee. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-
5(3) (1994).4 The director of the Department of Administrative 
Services is appointed by the Commiss ioner of Public Safety with the 
approval of the Governor. Utah Code Ann. § 53-1-203(2) (1998). 
The final director of WCF is the chief executive officer of the 
fund, who is selected by the other board members. Utah Code Ann. 
2Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-102 (Supp. 1997) . 
3Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (5) (Supp. 1997) . 
4Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106(3) (Supp. 1997). 
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§ 35-3-6(1) (a) (1994). Thus, the governor is directly or 
indirectly involved in the selection of all directors.5 
Here, there is even more control present than in Lebron. 
The Governor may remove directors of WCF for cause. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-3-5(10) (1994) .6 In Lebron, the President had no ability to 
remove directors of Amtrak for cause. 513 U.S. at 3 98, 115 S.Ct. 
at 974. 
Amtrakfs chartering act reserves Congress's right to 
repeal, alter, or amend the statute. Here, the right to repeal, 
alter, or amend WCF's authorizing statutes is not explicit, but is 
inherent in the legislative power. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-6 
(1994),7 defines the duties of the board. Nothing prevents the 
legislature from statutorily altering those duties. Indeed, 
nothing would prevent the legislature from dissolving WCF. Any 
director failing to comply with such a statutory mandate could be 
removed by the Governor, and replaced by a director who would 
follow legislative mandates. 
WCF grossly overestimates the protections that due 
process, uniform operation, and the prohibition of special laws 
provides to it. Amicus br. at 18-19. "[A] special law is a law 
that classifies its objects unreasonably, as by selecting from a 
5The State's assertion that "the governor appoints part of the 
board," State's br. at 26, is an understatement of enormous 
dimension. 
6Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (10) (Supp. 1997) . 
7Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-107 (Supp. 1997), as 
amended. 
10 
general class particular persons, places, or things for the purpose 
of conferring privileges or imposing burdens." Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 645 (Utah 1989) . Thus, in State Tax 
Comm'n v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978), a one 
percent tax imposed on the State Insurance Fund was an invalid 
special law because the legislature had the ability to tax all 
providers of workers' compensation insurance. Outside the realm of 
taxation and insurance regulation, where the State may impose 
obligations on all insurers, the State only has direct control over 
the operations of WCF. Thus, statutes directing and controlling 
WCF's business operations are not violative of the prohibition 
against special laws. WCF is in a class by itself, as the only 
workers' compensation insurance provider created by the state and 
directly subject to legislative control. 
The legislature has, in fact, legislatively limited the 
authority of WCF. First, WCF has been required to be the insurer 
of last resort. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1994).8 In 
addition, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-103.5 (Supp. 1997), effective 
July 1, 1997, provides: 
§ 31A-33-103.5. Powers of Fund—Limitations 
(1) The fund may form or acquire subsidiaries 
in accordance with Section 31A-33-107 except as limited 
by Subsections (2) and (3) . 
(2) (a) Subject to applicable insurance rules 
and statutes, the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, or its subsidiaries, may offer only workers1 
compensation insurance products and services in 
Utah and other states until the Legislature enacts 
8The continued viability of this provision belies WCF's 
contention that uniform operation and special law protections 
insulate WCF from state control. The facts are to the contrary. 
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legislation addressing the recommendations of a 
legislatively authorized study of the fund's 
authority, if any, to offer insurance products or 
services other than workers' compensation insurance 
products or services either directly, through a 
subsidiary, or through a joint venture. 
(b) A subsidiary of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah may offer workers' 
compensation insurance coverage only in a state 
other than Utah. 
(3) There is a moratorium until July 1, 2000, 
on the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's authority, if 
any, to offer health insurance services including 
medical, surgical, hospital, and other ancillary medical 
expenses, by any means including directly, through a 
subsidiary, or through a joint venture. 
See also Laws 1997, ch. 204, §§ 7-11, as amended by Laws 1997 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 1, § l,9 uncodified material establishing a Blue Ribbon 
Committee to review and make recommendations concerning: 
(a) privatization of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah; 
(b) how to serve the residual market; 
(c) the granting of new insurance authority to 
the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah for competitive 
reasons; and 
(d) any related issue. 
Laws 1997, ch. 204, § 8(1) . Implicit in any review of WCF to make 
recommendations concerning its privatization is the fact that it is 
not an autonomous private insurer, as the State and WCF would have 
this Court believe. 
The details of what the Governor's appointees and the 
legislature dictate are unimportant. For present purposes, only 
the fact that the legislature and the Governor's appointees have 
control over the operations of WCF is important. That WCF's master 
gives it wide rein in handling day to day affairs does not render 
9A copy is attached as addendum A. 
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it any less a slave to the whims and desires of the state. Being 
subject to the control of the government, WCF is a state 
instrumentality for purposes of the fourth amendment. 
C. RELIANCE ON ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CASELAW IN 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT IS 
UNPRECEDENTED AND UNWARRANTED. 
Both the State and Amicus attempt to engraft an eleventh 
amendment analysis into the fourth amendment claim raised here. 
State's br. at pp. 18-29; Amicus br. at pp. 7-21. Neither cites 
any authority for the proposition that an eleventh amendment 
analysis should control or be persuasive in the fourth amendment 
context. The eleventh amendment provides: 
[Suits against state — Restriction of judicial power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State. 
The purpose of the amendment is easily understood: 
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent. This is the general sense and the general 
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the 
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the 
government of every state in the Union." 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 10 S.Ct. 504, 506, 33 L.Ed. 842 
(1890) (quoting The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
The eleventh amendment embodies a privilege of the state 
enforceable against the people. Quite the opposite, the fourth 
amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights embody rights of the 
people enforceable against the state through the fourteenth 
amendment. No reason in law or logic exists suggesting that 
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jurisprudence under the eleventh amendment should even be 
persuasive, much less control, when addressing rights guaranteed to 
the people under the Bill of Rights.10 
D. FISCAL INDEPENDENCE IS NOT DETERMINATIVE 
IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT. 
The State and Amicus correctly point out that WCF manages 
its own checkbook. State's br. at Point I.A.3.C., pp. 27-8; Amicus 
br. at Point I.e., pp. 19-21. However, this is irrelevant to 
whether state control of WCF renders it a state instrumentality. 
Amtrak manages its own checkbook, yet is still a government 
instrumentality subject to constitutional constraints. Lebron v. 
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 115 S. Ct. 961, 130 
L.Ed.2d 902 (1995). Doubtless, the Attorney General's Office, the 
FBI, and local police forces have their own budgets and manage 
their own checkbooks. Despite having its own checkbook, like those 
others WCF is also a government instrumentality. 
E. PRIOR LABELLING IS IRRELEVANT IN 
DETERMINING THE TRUE NATURE OF THE 
ENTITY. 
In finding that Amtrak is subject to constitutional 
constraints, the Lebron Court first addressed Congress1 express 
disclaimer in Amtrak's authorizing statute that stated it "'will 
10The contention of WCF that an eleventh amendment standard is 
"more sweeping" than the fourth amendment standard, Amicus br. at 
7-8 & n.5, is unsupported fantasy. The quoted material on which it 
relies only supports the contention that the fourth amendment is 
not implicated absent a search or seizure, despite the actor's 
status as a governmental instrumentality. Likewise, the fourth 
amendment is only implicated with respect to WCF when it engages in 
searches and seizures, despite its status as a state 
instrumentality. 
14 
not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.' 
84 Stat., at 1330; see 45 U.S.C. § 541." Lebron, 513 U.S. at 391, 
115 S.Ct. at 970. The Supreme Court held this disclaimer to be of 
no effect: 
But it is not for Congress to make the final 
determination of Amtrak's status as a government entity 
for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of 
citizens affected by its actions. If Amtrak is, by its 
very nature, what the Constitution regards as the 
Government, congressional pronouncement that it is not 
such can no more relieve it of its First Amendment 
restrictions than a similar pronouncement could exempt 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Fourth 
Amendment. The Constitution constrains governmental 
action "by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that 
action may be taken." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
346-347, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880) . And under whatever 
congressional label. 
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392-3, 115 S.Ct. at 971. 
In engrafting its eleventh amendment analysis onto the 
fourth amendment, the State argues at length concerning "How state 
law characterizes the entity." State's brief at Point I.A.3.a., 
pp. 2 0-25. Amicus curiae WCF takes the same misguided approach. 
Amicus brief at Point I.A., pp. 8-17. In addressing the 
sovereign's immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment, such 
an inquiry is eminently reasonable. Under Lebron, this inquiry is 
improper and irrelevant when assessing the constraints of the Bill 
of Rights. It matters not how the Utah legislature has attempted 
to characterize WCF; likewise prior judicial determinations in 
other contexts are not helpful. Lebron requires this Court to look 
at the true nature of WCF, rather than any label attached to it in 
the past, to determine if it is a government actor for purposes of 
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constitutional constraints. As set forth above, it is a government 
actor, 
POINT II. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
HERE WILL HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT ON WCF. 
(Replying to Amicus br. at Point II, pp. 21-27) 
WCF asserts that, even if it is the government for 
purposes of the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule should not 
be applied because the deterrent function of the rule would not be 
effectively served. To the contrary, the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule would be efficaciously served here. 
As WCF concedes, it regularly becomes involved in 
investigation of workers' compensation fraud and referral of such 
cases to other State authorities: 
Like employees of other workers' compensation insurance 
companies, they investigate claims to determine if the 
claims are valid and also if there is potential fraud. 
If the fraud is potentially criminal, they provide this 
information to the Utah Insurance Department's Special 
Investigations Unit for further investigation. 
Amicus br. at 24. Indeed, WCF asserts a contractual obligation to 
so act. Amicus br. at 25. "WCF will continue to investigate 
fraudulent claims submitted to it, regardless of how those claims 
are treated in subsequent criminal prosecution." Amicus br. at 26. 
Thus, the unconstitutional conduct at issue here is likely to recur 
in the future, if not deterred by application of the exclusionary 
rule.11 
l:LIndeed, further illegalities already have occurred. In State 
v. Donald S. Putzier, No. 981901105 FS, WCF used a consent form 
identical to that at issue here, and again turned over medical 
records obtained to prosecutorial authorities in contravention of 
(continued...) 
16 
At the outset, it is useful to focus on the precise claim 
raised here. Ms. Ellingsworth only asserts that, under the 
specific terms of the limited consent she signed, WCF exceeded the 
scope of the consent by disclosing her private medical files to 
prosecutorial authorities. No claim has been made that WCF is 
constitutionally precluded from investigating claims submitted to 
it. But it must do so in a constitutional manner. 
WCF's claim that it "will continue to investigate 
fraudulent claims submitted to it, regardless of how those claims 
are treated in subsequent criminal prosecution," is not a basis for 
avoiding application of the exclusionary rule here. To the extent 
WCF is trying to say that it does not care about the results of 
criminal prosecution, such an assertion rings hollow. WCF's 
appearance as amicus curiae here, and the considerable time and 
resources expended in that appearance, conclusively establish that 
WCF is intensely interested in the results of workers' compensation 
fraud prosecutions. 
WCF is not like the neutral court clerks at issue in 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 
(1995) : 
Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime, see Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed.2d 
43 6 (1948) , they have no stake in the outcome of 
particular criminal prosecutions. Cf. Leon, supra, 468 
11
 ( . . .continued) 
the express limitation in the consent form. That case has been 
stayed by Judge Atherton pending a decision in the instant appeal. 
In all probability, other examples exist. 
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U.S., at 917, 104 S. Ct. , at 3417-3418; Krull, supra, 480 
U.S., at 352, 107 S. Ct. , at 1168. The threat of 
exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such 
individuals from failing to inform police officials that 
a warrant had been quashed. Cf. Leon, supra, 468 U.S., 
at 917, 104 S.Ct., at 3417-3418; Krull, supra, 480 U.S., 
at 352, 107 S.Ct., at 1168. 
Evans, 514 U.S. at 15, 115 S.Ct. at 1193. Because WCF has a stake 
in the outcome, and acts as an adjunct to law enforcement in 
ferreting out workers' compensation fraud, the exclusionary rule 
will have its full intended deterrent effect here. 
To the extent WCF implies that it will continue to use 
the same consent form, and ignore the explicit limitations 
contained therein, it is acting in bad faith and contrary to law. 
Such a course of conduct cries out for application of the 
exclusionary rule as a specific deterrent. As a "good corporate 
citizen," Amicus br. at 25, WCF should strive to conform its 
conduct to the mandates of the law. If unwilling to do so, the 
exclusionary rule serves a valuable function in attempting to 
persuade it to do so, and in highlighting the value that we as 
Americans and Utahns place on our individual rights and freedoms as 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and the state constitution. To 
the extent application of the exclusionary rule causes WCF to 
change its consent form or its practices with respect to it, 
exclusion achieves that portion of its intended deterrent purpose. 
WCF's assertion that "it is hard to understand how WCF 
could change its behavior," Amicus br. at 26, is ridiculous. For 
starters, it could change its consent form. If WCF intends to turn 
over medical records to prosecutorial authorities, it must use a 
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consent form that permits it to do so. The sentence, "This 
information will be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my 
claim for workers compensation benefits," should be replaced with 
language that is either unlimited in scope (e.g., "any and all 
purposes") or language that expressly warns the claimant that the 
records can be turned over to prosecutorial authorities for 
pursuing criminal charges of workers' compensation fraud. Any such 
consent should avoid the constitutional infirmity here. 
Alternatively, WCF could abide by the terms of its consent form and 
not turn medical records over to prosecutorial authorities. 
WCF's claim that it has no mechanism for obtaining 
warrants is meritless. Like any citizen, it may approach the 
police or the district attorney with information establishing 
probable cause and have them apply for a warrant. WCF's apparent 
contention that it will be hamstrung if not permitted to violate 
the constitution is baseless and insulting to the notions of 
ordered liberty on which our society is premised. 
WCF argues that it had an independent basis for 
collecting Ms. Ellingsworth's records, and thus exclusion would 
serve no purpose. Not so. We are not here concerned with the 
initial act of collecting her records, but rather with the 
subsequent unwarranted act of turning those records over for use in 
prosecution in contravention of an express limitation in the 
consent obtained. The purpose of that act had nothing to do with 
WCF's insurance business. Ms. Ellingsworth's claim had been 
denied. WCF's purpose in turning the records over to prosecutors 
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was to have Ms. Ellingsworth criminally prosecuted. The deterrent 
function of the exclusionary rule will operate admirably here in 
deterring such unconstitutional actions in the future. 
POINT III. CITIZENS HAVE AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THEIR MEDICAL 
RECORDS. 
(Responding to Amicus br. at Point III, pp. 27-37) 
A. THE STATE NEVER CHALLENGED WHETHER MS. 
ELLINGSWORTH HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 
OF PRIVACY IN HER RECORDS OR WHETHER SHE 
HAD STANDING, AND THESE ISSUES ARE NOT AN 
APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE ON OTHER 
GROUNDS. 
For the first time on appeal, WCF asserts that Ms. 
Ellingsworth had no reasonable expectation of privacy in her 
medical records, and lacked standing to assert a violation of her 
constitutional rights. WCF has failed to comply with Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a) (5) (A) or -(B), by including in its brief 
a citation to where in the record these issues were preserved (they 
were not) or giving a statement of grounds for seeking review of 
this unpreserved issue. 
Appellate courts may only affirm on alternate grounds 
where there is an adequate factual basis apparent on the record, a 
circumstance not present here. 
"The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or 
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial 
court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this 
is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or 
argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower 
court." 
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Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 
(1969) (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(1)). 
Critical to affirmance is the requirement that 
the ground or theory be "apparent on the record." Id. 
If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first 
time on appeal is not apparent on the record, the 
principle of affirming on any proper ground has no 
application. To hold otherwise would invite the 
prevailing party to selectively focus on issues below, 
the effect of which is holding back issues that the 
opposition had neither notice of nor an opportunity to 
address. Because of this due process component, 
"apparent on the record," in this context, means more 
than mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary to 
the "new" ground or theory. The record must contain 
sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the 
ground or theory to place a person of ordinary 
intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely 
thereon on appeal. 
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here, standing defects are not "apparent on the record" 
within the meaning of Montoya. Ms. Ellingsworth was not placed on 
notice that the State contested her standing, and had no 
opportunity or reason to address the issue. Had such a claim been 
made below, she would have prevailed based on the argument set 
forth herein. 
B. UNDER ARTICLE I, § 14, MS. ELLINGSWORTH 
HAS STANDING TO RAISE HER CLAIMS AND HAS 
A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
HER BANK RECORDS. 
Utah case law affirms that individuals retain a privacy 
interest in their medical records. The analytical approach 
utilized by case law relied upon by WCF has been categorically 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), the Supreme 
Court held that individuals had no privacy interest in bank records 
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that was cognizable by the fourth amendment. Professor LaFave 
characterizes this decision as "dead wrong." Wayne R. LaFave, 1 
Search and Seizure § 2.7(c), at 631 & n.52 (3rd ed. 1996). Relying 
on Miller and its analytical approach, some courts have held that 
individuals have no cognizable privacy interest in medical records. 
See generally LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.7(d), pp. 638-40; 
cases cited in Amicus br. at 31-32. 
The Utah Supreme Court has authoritatively and 
categorically rejected Miller and the analysis it employs. In 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the court held that 
individuals in Utah have a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest in their bank records under article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Similarly, under the reasoning of Thompson, Ms. 
Ellingsworth has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in 
her medical records. The cases cited by WCF at 31-2, all from 
jurisdictions other than Utah, perish in the presence of Thompson. 
Similarly, Rule 506 or the Utah Rules of Evidence creates 
a privilege held by the patient which prevents health professionals 
from disclosing medical records or other information to anyone. 
This privilege is only waived if the patient asserts a claim or 
defense in a proceeding that places his or her physical condition 
at issue. Ms. Ellingsworth has not done so here. She has not sued 
for benefits, a claim in a proceeding which would put her physical 
condition at issue, nor did she raise any defense which put her 
physical condition at issue. Her medical records remain privileged 
under Rule 5 06. 
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Other sources of legal protection exist. Utah Admin. R. 
156-67-602 provides that medical records shall be maintained in 
accordance with the Code of Medical Ethics of the Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs as published in the AMA Policy 
Compendium, 1996 edition. This in turn provides: 
The information disclosed to a physician during the 
course of the relationship between physician and patient 
is confidential to the greatest possible degree. The 
patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of 
information to the physician in order that the physician 
may most effectively provide needed services. The 
patient should be able to make this disclosure with the 
knowledge that the physician will respect the 
confidential nature of the communication. The physician 
should not reveal confidential communications or 
information without the express consent of the patient, 
unless required to do so by law. 
Code of Medical Ethics of the Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs, Opinion 5.05 (1996). All patients have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their medical records. 
C. FILING A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM DOES 
NOT VITIATE AN INDIVIDUAL'S PRIVACY 
INTEREST IN MEDICAL RECORDS, AS WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS ARE FREE TO 
WITHDRAW THEIR CLAIMS. 
WCF in essence asserts that Ms. Ellingsworth's act of 
filing a workers' compensation claim permanently and irrevocably 
waived her privacy interest in all of her former medical records. 
To the contrary, a claimant is free to withdraw his or her claim. 
If he or she does, he or she will not receive benefits, but no 
other penalty attaches. The workers' compensation system does not 
compel disclosure of records; it only requires a claimant to either 
disclose his or her records or forgo receiving benefits. Even the 
23 
State recognizes this: "defendant was simply given the permissible 
choice of releasing her records or surrendering her benefits." 
State's br. at 33. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-97(8) (1994) (now codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-407 (1997)), relied on by WCF at 29, provides 
that health professionals attending to a claimant's job related 
injury must provide reports to the Industrial Commission. It does 
not require that every health professional who has ever treated a 
person who later becomes injured in a job-related accident provide 
medical reports to the commission. Through Ms. Ellingsworth's 
release, WCF was seeking prior medical records for treatment of 
injuries unrelated to the industrial accident. These records do 
not fall within § 34A-2-407. WCF had no claim of right to the 
medical reports it obtained pursuant to Ms. Ellingsworth's release. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-91 (1994) (now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-602 (1997)), relied on by WCF at p. 29, likewise recognizes 
that a claimant may refuse to consent to a physical examination. 
Should one do so, only the right to benefits is lost. The 
examination may not be compelled. 
D. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS CANNOT ALTER THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OR MEANING OF A CONSENT. 
WCF argues that provisions of the Workers' Compensation 
Act, as well as broad public policy concerns for effective criminal 
enforcement, must be read into the consent form and establish that 
the scope of the consent was not exceeded. However, it cites no 
legal authority for these propositions. The consent can only be 
interpreted by reference to its own language. If WCF wanted to be 
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able to use Ms. Ellingsworth1s records for any purpose reasonably 
contemplated by the Workers' Compensation Act, it was required to 
include language to that effect in the release. If it wanted to be 
able to use her records for any purpose consistent with the "strong 
public policy encouraging persons to report criminal activity," 
Amicus br. at 36, it was required to include language to that 
effect in the release. 
POINT IV. PUBLIC POLICY NEVER OVERRIDES 
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES. 
(Responding to Amicus br. at Point IV, pp. 38-42) 
WCF fails to provide any authority for the absurd 
proposition that public policy concerns can override constitutional 
mandates. The greatest public policy concern is that the mandates 
of the state and federal constitutions be followed. WCF's 
contention that the lesser public policy of crime prevention can 
somehow override constitutional mandates specifically addressing 
crime investigation and enforcement is frivolous. Cf. Rule 11, 
U.R.C.P., applicable through Rule 81(e). 
* * * 
Ms. Ellingsworth relies on her opening brief in response 
to those portions of the State's and Amicus Curiae's briefs not 
specifically responded to herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Ellingsworth respectfully 
requests that the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress be 
reversed, that her conviction be reversed, and that the case be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Laws 1 9 9 7 , c h . 2 0 4 , §§ 7 - 1 1 
HB175 UTAH LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1997 
(a) willful or malicious failure to guard or warn 
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or 
activity; 
(b) deliberate, willful, or malicious injury to 
persons or property; or 
(c) an injury suffered where the owner of land 
charges a person to enter or go on the land or use 
the land for any recreational purpose, except that 
where land is leased to the state or a subdivision of 
the state, any consideration received by the owner 
for the lease is not a charge within the meaning of 
this section. 
(2) Any person who hunts upon a posted hunting 
unit, as authorized by Title 23, Chapter 23, is not 
considered to have paid a fee within the meaning of 
this section. 
(3) Owners of a dam or reservoir who allow 
recreational use of the dam or reservoir and its 
surrounding area and do not themselves charge a fee 
for that use, are considered not to have charged for 
that use within the meaning of Subsection (l)(c), 
even if the user pays a fee to the Division of Parks 
and Recreation for the use of the services and 
facihties at that dam or reservoir. 
H.B. 175 
Passed 3/5/97, Approved 3/17/97 
Effective 05-May-97 
Laws of Utah 1997, Chapter 204 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
Sponsor: Jeff Alexander 
AN ACT Relating to Insurance; Amending 
Restrictions On Name Used By the 
Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah; 
Addressing Powers of Fund; Amending 
D u t i e s of the Board of Directors ; 
El iminat ing Requirement of Annual 
Financial Audit By State Auditor; Creating 
the Blue Ribbon Commission On the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; 
Providing for Membership of Commission; 
Delineating Responsibilities and Procedures 
of Commission; Providing a Reporting Date 
for C o m m i s s i o n ; M a k i n g Technica l 
Corrections; Providing an Effective Date; 
and Providing a Repeal Date. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
31A-33-103 (Effective 07/01/97), as 
renumbered and amended by Chapter 240, Laws 
of Utah 1996 
31A-33-107 (Effective 07/01/97), as 
renumbered and amended by Chapter 240, Laws 
of Utah 1996 
31A-33-110 (Effective 07/01/97), as 
renumbered and amended by Chapter 240, Laws 
of Utah 19% 
35A-1-404, as enacted by Chapter 240, Laws of 
Utah 1996 
67-3-9, as enacted by Chapter 323, Laws of Utah 
1990 
ENACTS: 
31A-33-103.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 This 
act enacts uncodified material. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 31A-33-103 (Effective 07/ 
01/97) is amended to read: 
31A-33-103 (Effective 07/01/97). Legal nature 
of Workers' Compensation Fund. 
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund is: 
(a) a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public 
corporation; and 
(b) a legal entity, [which] that may sue and be 
sued in its own name. 
(2) All of the business and affairs of the 
corporation shall be conducted in the name of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah or if 
conducted through a subsidiary, such other 
corporate names that comply with state law. 
Section 2. Section 31A-33-103.5 is enacted to 
read: 
31A-33-103.5. Powers of Fund - Limitations. 
(1) The fund may form or acquire subsidiaries in 
accordance with Section 31A-33-107 except as 
limited by Subsections (2) and (3). 
(2) (a) Subject to applicable insurance rules and 
statutes, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
or its subsidiaries, may offer only workers' 
compensation insurance products and services in 
Utah and other states until the Legislature enacts 
legislation addressing the recommendations of a 
legislatively authorized study of the fund's 
authority, if any, to offer insurance products or 
services other than workers' compensation insurance 
products or services either directly, through a 
subsidiary, or through a joint venture. 
(b) A subsidiary of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah may offer workers' compensation 
insurance coverage only in a state other than Utah. 
(3) There is a moratorium until July 1, 2000, on 
the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's 
authority, if any, to offer health insurance services 
including medical, surgical, hospital, and other 
ancillary medical expenses, by any means including 
directly, through a subsidiary, or through a joint 
venture. 
Section 3. Section 31A-33-107 (Effective 07/ 
01/97) is amended to read: 
31A-33-107 (Effective 07/01/97). Duties of 
board - Creation of subsidiaries. 
(1) The board shall: 
(a) appoint a chief executive officer to administer 
the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(b) receive and act upon financial, management, 
and actuarial reports covering the operations of the 
Workers* Compensation Fund; 
(c) ensure that the Workers' Compensation Fund 
is administered according to law; 
(d) examine and approve an annual operating 
budget for the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(e) serve as investment trustees and fiduciaries of 
the Injury Fund; 
(f) receive and act upon recommendations of the 
chief executive officer; 
(g) develop broad policy for the long-term 
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Session. 
[(§*)] © This Subsection (4)[(b)] providing for the 
jtudy of 24-hour insurance coverage is repealed 
December 31, 19%. 
(5) (a) The acting executive director, with the 
concurrence of the Utah Association of Counties 
Executive Board, shall establish a work group with 
broad representation from the Utah Association of 
Counties, clients, providers, persons having 
oversight, and other persons interested in the 
workforce development functions of the department 
including boards and councils associated with 
programs administered prior to the consolidation. 
The work group shall develop recommendations for: 
(i) selecting the regional councils on workforce 
services; 
(ii) enabling local governments within a 
consortium of counties that express interest in 
writing to the acting executive director, to have 
greater autonomy in administering Division of 
Employment Development services that are provided 
by regional workforce services areas; 
(iii) enabling regional councils on workforce 
services to develop policies for administering and 
delivering programs provided in regional workforce 
services areas in a manner as to be responsible to 
consortiums of counties; 
(iv) providing funding for staff that is responsible 
to counties and other resources to enable meaningful 
local involvement in the operations of the Division 
of Employment Development; 
(v) a mechanism by which regional consortiums of 
counties shall contract for needed services from 
counties, educational institutions, businesses, labor 
unions, or any other public or private providers; 
(vi) a process to ensure that the regional councils 
on workforce services that represent local 
government and private interests, the State Council 
on Workforce Services, and the executive director 
will work in partnership to determine how to 
implement federal block grants, if any, administered 
through the Division of Employment Development; 
(vii) a process by which funds will be allocated to 
regional workforce services areas for administration 
and delivery of services according to regional and 
local priorities; 
(viii) use of the Job Training Partnership Act, 
Turning Point, SPEID, and other case management 
models for job descriptions and responsibilities in 
the department; and 
(be) process whereby specific county needs for 
priorities of training emphasis can be met within the 
consortium of counties through the regional council 
on workforce services; and 
(x) processes to ensure equity and full 
participation by all counties in a consortium of 
counties. 
(b) The recommendations made under Subsection 
(5Xa) shall ensure the concepts of: 
(i) employment assistance centers; 
(ii) unified case management; 
(iii) statewide consistency in: 
(A) information systems; 
(B) administrative criteria; 
(C) legal restrictions; and 
(D) personnel management and equitable 
personnel benefit systems; 
(iv) Turning Pointy clients and services will 
continue to be offered in educational settings, when 
possible; and 
(v) state and federal law requirements for or 
restrictions on the operation of the department. 
(c) The acting executive director and the Utah 
Association of Counties through its executive board 
or their designees shall jointly suggest legislation for 
presentation during the 1997 Annual General 
Session based on the recommendations made by the 
work group under Subsection (5)(a). If no joint 
agreement is reached, separate reports may be 
presented. 
Section 6. Section 67-3-9 is amended to read: 
67-3-9. Audit of independent agencies. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Auditor" means the state auditor. 
(b) "Compliance audit" means an audit of an 
independent agency's compliance with relevant 
statutes, rules, policies, and regulations that govern 
that independent agency. 
(c) (i) "Governing board" means the board, 
committee, council or other body, however 
designated, with responsibility for making policy 
and overseeing the operations of the independent 
agency. 
(ii) "Governing board" does not mean the 
manager, president, or other individual responsible 
for daily management of the independent agency. 
(d) "Independent agency" means [the Workers' 
Compensation Fund,]: 
0} the Utah Technology Finance Corporation^]; 
(ii) the Utah Housing Finance Agency[7]; and (iii) the Retirement Board and Office. 
(2) The auditor shall: 
(a) conduct an annual financial and compliance 
audit of each independent agency; and 
(b) issue an audit report detailing [his] the 
auditor's findings and recommendations to: 
(i) the governing board of each independent 
agency; and 
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst for 
submission to the relevant legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
Section 7. Blue Ribbon Workers' Compensation 
Commission - Creation - Membership -
Quorum • Compensation - Staff. 
(1) The commissioner of insurance shall examine 
the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah in 
accordance with Section 31A-2-203 and this act. 
The commissioner of insurance shall designate as the 
examiner in charge the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah that 
shall exist until November 30, 1997. The commission 
shall consist of the following 15 members: 
(a) two members of the Senate appointed by the 
president of the Senate, no more than one of whom 
may be from the same political party; 
(b) three members of the House of 
Representatives appointed by the speaker of the 
House of Representatives, no more than two of 
whom may be from the same political party; and 
(c) the following members jointly appointed by 
the president of the Senate and the speaker of the 
House of Representatives: 
(i) the commissioner of insurance; 
(ii) the chair of the Industrial Commission or as 
of July 1,1997, the labor commissioner; 
(iii) a representative of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah; 
(iv) three representatives of the insurance 
industry, one of whom shall be a health 
underwriter; 
(v) two representatives of employers; and 
(vi) two representatives of employees. 
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(2) The commissioner of insurance shall serve as 
the chair of the commission. 
(3) A majority of the members of the commission 
constitutes a quorum. The action of a majority of a 
quorum constitutes the action of the commission. 
(4) (a) The members of the commission who are 
legislators shall receive no compensation or expenses 
for their services on the commission. 
(b) Members of the commission who are state 
employees shall receive no compensation or expenses 
for their service on the commission except for 
compensation and expenses provided by the agency 
by which they are employed. 
(c) Members of the commission who are not 
legislators or state employees shall receive no 
compensation or expenses for their service on the 
commission. 
(5) The Insurance Department shall provide staff 
support to the commission. 
Section 8. Duties - Interim report. 
(1) Notwithstanding Subsection 31A-2-204Q), 
the scope of the examination is limited to reviewing 
and making recommendations on the following 
issues: 
(a) privatization of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah; 
(b) how to serve the residual market; 
(c) the granting of new insurance authority to the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah for 
competitive reasons; and 
(d) any related issue. 
(2) If the commission considers a recommendation 
for the privatization or any similar change to the 
structure or operat ions of the Workers ' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the commission, and 
not the Workers' Compensation Fund, shall provide 
an independent financial analysis to determine: 
(a) the nature and amount of monetary claims by 
the state, policy holders, or others to the surplus 
and assets of the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah; and 
(b) whether any officer or director of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah has a claim 
for any compensation, either monetary or through 
an ownership interest, as a result of or in the 
process of any privatization or similar changes to 
the structure or operations of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(3) A final report, including any proposed 
legislation shall be presented to the Business, Labor, 
and Economic Development Interim Committee by 
the interim committee's 1997 November meeting. 
(4) The examination required under this act is not 
subject to Subsection 31A-2-204Q) or Subsections 
31A-2-204(6) through (10). 
Section 9. Funding. 
(1) Pursuant to Section 31A-2-205, the 
reasonable costs of the commission's examination 
shall be reimbursed by the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah to the Insurance Department. 
(2) The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
may offset the examination expenses paid pursuant 
to the section against premium taxes under 
Subsection 59-9-102(2). 
Section 10. Effective date. 
Sections 31A-33-103, 31A-33-103.5, 31A-
33-107, 31A-33-110, 35A-1-404, and 67-3-
9 take effect July 1, 1997. Sections 7 through 11, 
uncodified material, take effect May 5,1997. 
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Section 11. Repeal date. 
Sections 7 through 9 are repealed November 30. 
1997: •— 
H.B. 177 
Passed 2/6/97, Approved 2/21/97 
Effective 05-May-97 
Laws of Utah 1997, Chapter 7 
Post Certification of Youth Corrections 
Workers 
Sponsor: Blake D. Chard 
AN ACT Relating to Code of Criminal 
Procedure; Extending the P.o.s.t. 
Certification Requirement for Youth 
Corrections Workers for One Year. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
77-la-2, as last amended by Chapter 163, Laws 
of Utah 1996 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 77-la-2 is amended to read: 
77-la-2. Correctional officer. 
(1) (a) "Correctional officer" means an officer or 
employee of the Department of Corrections, youth 
corrections, any political subdivision of the state, or 
any private entity which contracts with the state or 
its political subdivisions to incarcerate inmates, who 
is charged with the primary duty of providing 
community protection. 
(b) "Correctional officer" includes an individual 
assigned to carry out any of the following types of 
functions: 
(i) controlling, transporting, supervising, and 
taking into custody of persons arrested or convicted 
of crimes; 
(ii) supervising and preventing the escape of 
persons in state and local incarceration facilities; 
and 
(iii) guarding and managing inmates and 
providing security and enforcement services at a 
correctional facility. 
(2) (a) Correctional officers have peace officer 
authority only while engaged in the performance of 
their duties. The authority of correctional officers 
employed by the Department of Corrections is 
regulated by Title 64, Chapter 13, Department of 
Corrections - State Prison. 
(b) Correctional officers may carry firearms only 
if authorized by and under conditions specified by 
the director of the Department of Corrections or the 
chief law enforcement officer of the employing 
agency. 
(3) (a) An individual may not exercise the 
authority of a correctional officer until the 
individual has satisfactorily completed a basic 
training program for correctional officers and the 
director of the Department of Corrections or the 
chief administrator of the employing agency b** 
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